


SOVIET AFFAIRS ANALYSIS SERVICE

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Outline Of Reference Paper On:

CONFLICTS IN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT



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Instead of serving as a sounding board to the new Party program, the twenty-second Soviet Party Congress became a forum for dissension in the Party leadership. The instability of the upper ranks of the Party was reflected in the mild tone of Khrushchev's report on foreign policy.

Khrushchev's report confirmed the view that the Soviets are engaged in consolidating a "Soviet empire" in Eastern Europe--based on states rather than ideologies. In this context, Albania's fractious attitude toward the Kremlin may be more dangerous to the Soviet plans than was previously thought. The other Balkan countries are attracted by Albania's example of national Communist independence.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Albania at the Party Congress, which served as an oblique chastisement of Peking, may thus very well have stood on its own merits.

The Soviet leader's attack further indicated that the Albanian, or Red Chinese, ideas on foreign policy are working on certain people in the upper stratum of the Soviet Communist Party.

In his struggle for Party leadership, Khrushchev has had not only to suppress the orthodox, conservative wing in the Party but also to make increasingly larger concessions to the young Party intelligentsia, which supports him. The possibility that Khrushchev may moderate Soviet foreign policy is connected with his dependence on the young generation.

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CONFLICTS IN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Expectations that the promised utopia of the new Party program would be the dominant theme of the twenty-second Soviet Party Congress did not materialize. The Congress became, instead, a mirror of internal dissension in Soviet and world Communism. Instability was revealed not only in the Soviet Party leadership, but in the mutual relations between the Communist Parties of the world Communist movement.

It was to be expected that in the period preceding the Congress there should be sharp skirmishes within the Party leadership--scene of perpetual power struggle. In accordance with the principle of "systematic renewal" of the leading ranks of the Party, embodied in the drafts of the Party program and of the Party statutes, the Congress had to remove and replace not fewer than three regular members and two candidates from the powerful Party presidium and not fewer than 75 members and candidates of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee. In accordance with traditional Soviet organizational procedure, arrangements regarding these replacements were made before the Congress meeting; the necessary decisions were taken in the Secretariat of the Central Committee and were discussed at its plenary session, held three days prior to the opening of the Congress. Distribution of posts in the future leadership has always led to a struggle, expressed in disagreements on theory and in efforts of factions to defend their particular domestic and foreign policies. This year the struggle unexpectedly came into the open.

The internal Party conflict undoubtedly had a bearing on the mild tone of Khrushchev's foreign policy report, which hinted at the possibility of a decrease in international tension and at a moderation of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Party chief omitted the ultimatum-like threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany before the end of the year. He implied that the ultimatum was an invention of "representatives of the Western powers."

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As to the possibility of improving the international situation, Khrushchev emphasized the attempts of the Soviet government to establish "businesslike relations with all countries" and "in the first place with the United States of America." He declared that Soviet foreign policy was directed toward "peaceful coexistence," the principles of which "unfailingly remain the general basis of Soviet foreign policy," and confirmed his former thesis on the possibility of averting world wars. These last two declarations were most probably addressed to the Chinese and Albanian Communists, who have long challenged the thesis of peaceful coexistence.

What caused Khrushchev to speak of moderating Soviet foreign policy? One factor certainly was a pragmatic assessment by the Kremlin of the alarm caused in Central Europe by the aggressive Soviet policy and of the negative reaction of the Soviet population. The Soviet government no doubt has found it desirable to attempt some reduction of tension, provided it be brought about without damage to Soviet prestige at home and abroad. On the other hand, the "disagreements" between the great powers in the West have become an idee fixe for the Soviet Communist Party, and the Soviet government obviously hopes that in the future it will be possible to increase these disagreements. It therefore does not wish to eradicate them by aggravating the German and West European problems. However, the most important factor causing this new zigzag in Soviet foreign policy is obviously the instability and increased tension within the Communist bloc and especially between the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the latter's Albanian camp-followers.

Khrushchev's report contained unmistakable confirmations that the Soviets are engaged in Eastern Europe in consolidating a "Soviet empire," --based on states rather than ideologies. This policy is causing serious discontent among the Chinese Communist leaders. In his report, Khrushchev stated that in the peoples' democracies "the multiplicity of economies has been eliminated" and substituted with a policy of "international socialist distribution of labor, specialization, co-operation in production, and co-ordination of national economic plans."

The conduct of the Albanian Communist leaders who, with an assist from Peking, wrested their country from the Soviet complex, is having a disintegrating effect on Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest, which are attracted by the example of national Communist independence. It may be guessed that for the Kremlin the existence of free Berlin within the body of the "socialist bloc" is less harmful than the existence of an obstinate and even hostile Albania in the geographical complex of Eastern Europe. Therefore, Khrushchev allotted an important place in his report to Albania and to the heretical policy of its Communist leadership. It is clear that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party deliberately created the precedent of destructive criticism of a people's democracy in the presence of leading representatives of the Communist parties of the world. Khrushchev stated:

... Recently the Albanian leaders, in spite of their former assurances and the decisions of their Party Congress, have

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without any reason suddenly changed their political course and embarked on the path of sharp deterioration in their relations with our Party, with the Soviet Union. They have started to depart from the agreed line of the whole world Communist movement on the most important question of our time--a process which has become particularly marked since the middle of last year (Pravda, October 18, 1961, p. 9).

It should be pointed out that it is the Soviet government that has not pursued the line determined by the Moscow conference of 81 parties held in November, 1960. It is the Soviet government that has selected its own independent path which it now wishes to impose on the entire Communist world. If these aspects are taken into account, the Congress may be regarded as a global operation by the Kremlin to counter the November, 1960, conference.

When Khrushchev proclaimed that in the matter of foreign policy the Soviets could not "make concessions on any main question, either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else," he apparently referred also to the Communist leadership in Peking. Red China displayed contempt for the Congress and for Khrushchev by sending to the Congress a delegation headed by Premier Chou En-Lai, who is by no means the leader of the Communist Party hierarchy in Peking. (Almost all the other Communist Parties which came to the Congress were headed by the top leaders.)

Khrushchev's accusation that the Albanian Communist leaders "are trying to drag our Party back to practices which they like" is nothing but an imprudent admission that Albanian, or Red Chinese, ideas on foreign policy and ideology are exerting a definite influence even on certain people in the leading ranks of the Soviet Communist Party. The existence of an important group within Soviet leading circles which shares the orthodox standpoint on Party policy both within and outside the Soviet Union and which challenges Khrushchev's program of "innovation," revisionism, and falsification of Leninism, is indicated by the fact that four years after the victory over the "anti-Party" group, Khrushchev has described its activities in such detail and with new revelations. This situation and the obvious disapproval existing in certain circles and even in entire Communist parties abroad have caused the return to the problem of the "dethronement" of Stalin. Khrushchev would not otherwise have devoted so much attention to the problem, nor would he have given such a detailed justification of the measures taken.

In the framework of his denunciation of the "anti-Party" group, Khrushchev unexpectedly accused Kliment Y. Voroshilov not only of participating in the group but of instigating it together with Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Lazar M. Kaganovich, and Georgi M. Malenkov. Khrushchev accused Voroshilov of liquidating a large number of Communists, Komsomol members, and servicemen:

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To explain the paradox of Voroshilov's presence in the supreme organ of the current Congress as due to the liberality of Khrushchev and of the other Party leaders would be a mistake. They could not but be aware how much dangerous influence such a precedent could exercise on future developments in the Party. It should be added that it was not at all necessary to include Voroshilov in the Congress Presidium: his political stature and governmental status did not make his presence necessary. His "election" to the Congress Presidium was obviously a matter of political principle, and the unprecedented accusation by Khrushchev once more confirms the existence of an undefeated "orthodox" group in the leading ranks of the Party.

The instability within Soviet ruling circles was further confirmed by the presence at the Congress of Nikolai A. Bulganin, Mikhail G. Pervukhin, and even the disgraced Averki B. Aristov in the Congress Presidium. Additional evidence of political instability and of the lack of faultless management of the Congress proceedings was the deletion, and subsequent insertion, of statements by Khrushchev on Soviet nuclear tests, on the availability of 50- and 100-megaton bombs, and on the cessation of Soviet tests.

All this confirms the conclusion that a struggle is taking place within the Soviet Party leadership in which Khrushchev has to fight for his own authority and position. Further evidence is provided by the glowing propaganda articles about the obviously unsuccessful virgin lands undertaking, published in Pravda beginning October 11. These articles conceal the immense failure of this year's harvest.

In his struggle for Party leadership, Khrushchev is relying on new and young elements. He is supported by the Party intelligentsia, which comprises a large proportion (35.6 per cent) of the two and a half million new Party members admitted during the past five years. Speaking as a "fighter" for the "new," Khrushchev has on the one hand to wage a ruthless struggle against the orthodox, conservative wing in the Party, and on the other hand to decide on bigger and bigger concessions. It appears that the new constitution of the USSR, which he envisioned in his report, will be drafted with these factors in mind.

The possibility that Khrushchev may moderate Soviet foreign policy, especially on the German and West Berlin problem, is no doubt connected with his policy of relying on the support of the younger generation. This alternative, which has arisen because of the instability of the situation in the Soviet leadership, is encouraged by the necessity of fighting Peking's concept of increased international tension.

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